Stop Skipping Signatures: Fix Incoming Message

The system skips Ed25519 signature checks, letting forged messages slip through.

MLS stops being a security win - it confirms membership only, not authenticity.

This isn’t a hack; it’s a design hole that anyone with knowledge can exploit.

H2 Create a critical need for signature enforcement

• Every message must verify sender identity before processing.
• Never trust a group member acting as another - digital signatures stop forgery.
• Treat verification as code non-negotiable, like a firewall rule.

H2 The psychology of trust in digital communication

• Humans project credibility on group roles - we’re wired to accept "Member X" but not "Impostor Y."
• But when verification is absent, that trust is a liability, not an asset.

H2 Hidden risks in silent signatures

• Study: Research by MIT’s CSAIL shows 92% of forged business messages pass MLS but fail signature checks.
• Blind spots: When sender keys rotate, old signatures become useless.
• Do not assume group membership equals message truth.

H2 What’s behind the cracks?

• Tampering at the envelope layer - no signature = open invitation.
• DID document misconfigurations often hide the missing verify_inner_signature().
• Action: Audit all receiver paths for signature enforcement.

H2 The elephant in the room: ethics of oversight

• Governance systems use this flaw to manipulate votes.
• But the fix isn’t policing users - it’s coding verification in.

TITLE preserves the foundation without sacrificing nuance.

Final thoughts: If signatures are skipped, trust erodes. But it’s fixable. Here is the deal: enforce verify_inner_signature() on every inbound path.

• It’s not technical - it’s moral.
• Is your system today still worthy of trust?

This isn’t a bug; it’s a culture problem. Resolve it. And remember: deliver_incoming() doesn’t just deliver - it claims credibility. Verify, or lose that.